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IMMIGRATION

The Ninth Circuit’s Refugee EO Decision: Methodically Misreading the
Immigration Statute
By Peter Margulies

Tuesday, June 13, 2017, 8:30 AM

On Monday, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision that relied on statutory grounds in declining to vacate most of the preliminary injunction
against President Trump’s revised refugee executive order (EO). While a reliance on statutory instead of constitutional grounds is often a
calling card of judicial restraint, the methodical tone of the per curiam opinion by the Ninth Circuit panel (consisting of Judges Hawkins,
Gould, and Paez) is deceptive. Despite this generally measured tone, the opinion’s awed statutory analysis distorts precedent and disrupts
the carefully rendered framework of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
Before exploring the opinion’s skewed reading of the INA, it’s useful to stress that the Ninth Circuit modi ed part of the Hawaii District
Court’s injunction: the portion barring government review of visa-processing in the six countries identi ed in the EO. The government had
speci cally urged the court to make this change. As a result, the government can now review visa-processing procedures even as it seeks
review of the Ninth Circuit ruling, together with the decision of the Fourth Circuit denying a stay (in which Hawaii led a brief in the
Supreme Court today). As Mark Tushnet observed here, this modi cation of the District Court’s injunction also leaves open the possibility
that the government will complete its task before any Supreme Court review, upping the chances that the Court will hold that the case is
moot.
Because the Ninth Circuit decided the case on statutory grounds, it did not have to reach the Establishment Clause issue that drove the
Fourth Circuit’s decision (see my analysis here and Josh Blackman’s here). As a result, the Ninth Circuit’s decision says little about
Candidate Trump’s or President Trump’s statements about the EO, with one exception I’ll discuss later in this post. Suppose the Supreme
Court agrees to take the case, as Josh Blackman recommended in Monday’s New York Times, and determines that the plaintiffs have standing
(a question that the Ninth Circuit answered in the af rmative but which I will leave for others to address). At that point, the Court faces a
similar choice: take the Ninth Circuit’s view and deny a stay on statutory grounds, or rule that the EO is consistent with the INA, thus
requiring analysis of the Establishment Clause question.
Because the Ninth Circuit panel’s neutral tone masks serious errors in statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court should provide guidance
on that score. A brief review of the relevant touchstones in the INA’s architecture is in order (as I rst discussed here). Three subsections are
key. The rst provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (the “entry provision”), authorizes the President to “suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of
aliens” upon a nding that such entry would be “detrimental to the interests of the United States.” As I have suggested here, this provision
is broad, but not unbounded: it doesn’t authorize action that is arbitrary in light of Congress’ statutory scheme, such as the denial of
admission to lawful permanent residents and current visa-holders in the original refugee EO. The same limits apply to 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)
(B) (the “procedures provision”), which empowers the Secretary of State to “determine the procedures for the processing of immigrant visa
applications.” A third provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (the “nondiscrimination provision”) bars discrimination based on nationality in the
issuance of immigrant visas.
Harmonizing these provisions is the central task in this statutory analysis. The Ninth Circuit (1) read the “entry” provision too narrowly, (2)
ignored the “procedures” provision, and, (3) read the “nondiscrimination” provision too broadly. That’s statutory discord, not harmony.
In fairness, given the government’s unduly aggressive litigating posture, the panel would have needed to work hard to reach a different
result. The government’s take inverted the panel’s reading: Acting Solicitor General Jeffrey Wall read the “entry” provision as basically
neutering the “nondiscrimination” provision. According to the government, because under § 1182(f) the President can suspend “entry,” that
power is not limited by the nondiscrimination provision, which merely regulates “issuance of an immigrant visa.” Per SG Wall, the
government could under § 1182(f) deny entry to any and all visa recipients for any reason (apparently including invidious reasons) without
running afoul of the INA’s scheme. That stark position is an untenable reading of the statute. The entry, procedures, and nondiscrimination
provisions must be read together, as Judge Paez noted at the oral argument. However, that harmonious reading leads to a different outcome
than the one reached by the Ninth Circuit panel.
Just as the government’s reading errs by granting the President unchecked authority, the Ninth Circuit’s reading of § 1182(f) unduly
discounts the deference that the Supreme Court has shown the President in foreign affairs, particularly regarding the treatment of
prospective immigrants overseas. For example, the Supreme Court deferred to the executive branch in Kleindienst v. Mandel (1972), holding
that the government denied a nonimmigrant visa to a Marxist academic for a “facially legitimate and bona de reason” rooted in the visa
applicant’s participation in fundraising during a previous visit—although the applicant’s previous visa had not barred him from that activity.

A less deferential standard in Mandel might have led to a different result. Consider as well Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kerry v. Din
(2015), which rejected a due process challenge to denial of an immigrant visa to an Afghan national based on the applicant’s service as a
clerical of cial in a town controlled by the Taliban. Justice Kennedy, citing Mandel, opined that due process did not even require that the
government disclose to the applicant the speci c statutory subsection which formed the basis for the denial. As a result, the visa applicant
was left guessing about the government’s reasoning—not the usual outcome for a due process challenge. One can quibble with Justice
Kennedy’s reluctance to require such disclosure. However, there is no mistaking the deferential posture adopted by both the Mandel Court
and Justice Kennedy in Kerry v. Din.
These cases are just the tip of the iceberg of the Court’s deference to the President on national security, even when executive actions
concern U.S. citizens. The heart of the matter, as Justice Blackmun recognized in his opinion for the Court in Department of the Navy v. Egan
(1988), is that courts face a marked information de cit in assessing the fraught realm of foreign affairs. As a result, courts lack a solid
foundation for second-guessing executive decisions. In Haig v. Agee (1981), for example, the Court ruled that Congress had authorized the
President to revoke the passport of a former U.S. intelligence agent who wished to travel abroad. In Egan, the Court upheld a truncated
procedure for assessing the denial of a security clearance to a government employee. While Egan concerned a security clearance, Justice
Blackmun’s caution is also applicable to executive decisions about noncitizens overseas: each case involves “[p]redictive judgment” in which
a court lacks the tools to ascertain an “acceptable margin of error in assessing the potential risk.” That is precisely why the Supreme Court
deferred to the executive in each of the cases discussed above.
The Ninth Circuit dismisses deferential decisions like Kleindienst v. Mandel and Kerry v. Din in a perfunctory footnote. The per curiam
opinion distinguishes Mandel as addressing a visa denial rather than a mere pause in visa-processing (p. 33 n. 9). However, this reasoning
has Mandel and Din backwards. A denial of a visa is a nal decision that for the foreseeable future will preclude a noncitizen’s admission to
the United States. In contrast, the 90-day pause on admissions from the six countries listed in the revised EO is purely temporary in nature.
Moreover, as Justice Kagan observed in Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio (2014), visa processing typically “takes time.” As a longtime
immigration law practitioner, I’ve often reassured anxious clients that even routine visa adjudication involves a series of delays, such as
waits for interviews, obtaining additional information to con rm the applicant’s identity, and (at least for some visa categories) exhausting
the backlog of previous applicants. The wait is often 8-10 months, and may stretch into years. For most of the visa applicants affected by the
EO, a ninety-day pause will thus have little practical impact.
For those applicants who experience hardship and have compelling equities such as the need for family reuni cation, the revised EO
provides a waiver. The Ninth Circuit rejects the waiver option as posing a “substantial hardship” to applicants. That characterization, at odds
with the methodical language of the opinion as a whole, exaggerates the impact of lling out an additional form in a process replete with
them.
The Ninth Circuit’s disdain for deference isn’t merely of academic interest. Critically, that disregard leads the panel to an unduly
parsimonious de nition of Congress’s delegation to the President of power to suspend entry of noncitizens under § 1182(f) when entry is
“detrimental to the interests of the United States.” In making this nding regarding the six countries listed, the EO cited letters from the
Attorney General (AG) and Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS), who cited the bitter armed con icts raging in ve of the six countries
(Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen) and the sponsorship of terror by the sixth state, Iran. Both the AG and DHS believed that such
conditions made it more dif cult to base visa processing on information from the regimes in these states. This is the backdrop for President
Trump’s tweet, cited by the panel, that the countries themselves are “dangerous.” According to the EO, the 90-day pause in admissions from
the six countries was designed to ensure, in light of these challenging conditions, that U.S. consulates set “adequate standards” to prevent
danger to the United States.
That endeavor to assure adequate standards is at the core of Congress’s delegation to the executive branch in 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(B) (the
“procedures” provision). Many might argue that procedures are already adequate; indeed, that is my view. However, that position re ects a
policy dispute with the President. The Supreme Court’s precedents exhibit little interest for converting disputes about foreign policy into
binding law. On the contrary, the EO’s rationale for a 90-day pause in admissions from con ict zones is precisely the kind of assessment of
the “acceptable margin of error” that Justice Blackmun deferred to in Egan. The Ninth Circuit’s review is markedly more intrusive.
According to the Ninth Circuit, even a temporary pause in admissions with a built-in waiver requires the government to shoulder a heavy
burden. To justify the pause in admissions, the per curiam holds that the government must speci cally identify visa applicants from the six
listed countries as being members of terrorist organizations, “contributors to active con ict,” or personally “responsible for insecure country
conditions.” Shouldering that burden would require just the sort of heightened visibility into opaque country conditions that is absent in
con ict zones. As Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Kerry v. Din demonstrated, the government need not shoulder that burden, even for a visa
denial. The tradition of judicial deference would abjure such contortions for a temporary visa pause.
To be sure, there are limits on the President’s power under § 1182(f). The “nondiscrimination” provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A), prohibits
nationality-based discrimination in visa issuance. That provision is embedded in a sequence of INA provisions passed in 1965 that
dismantled the old, discredited system of permanent national origin quotas. The nondiscrimination provision prevents the President from

turning an interstitial, temporary pause into a permanent ban on an express or de facto basis. If the Supreme Court were to take either the
Ninth or Fourth Circuit cases, it should hold that 90 days is the outer limit for the government to accomplish the procedural, gap- lling goal
sought in the revised EO.
In sum, despite the Ninth Circuit’s methodical tone, it failed to give deference its due. Moreover, it failed to do what Judge Paez wisely
recommended at oral argument: read the provisions of the INA together. The Supreme Court should reset the balance.

Topics: Donald Trump, Executive Power, Immigration
Tags: Executive Order

Peter Margulies is a professor at Roger Williams University School of Law, where he teaches Immigration Law, National
Security Law and Professional Responsibility. He is the author of Law’s Detour: Justice Displaced in the Bush
Administration (New York: NYU Press, 2010).

